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SINCE EARLY 1985,  when the U.S. administration  began  to encourage  the 
depreciation  of the dollar  to reduce  the U.S. trade  imbalance,  there  has 
been considerable  discussion of the need for international  policy coor- 
dination  to bring about a "soft landing" in the world economy. Two 
kinds  of recessionary  risks  have been widely discussed. The first  is that 
the United States will do little about  its budget  deficit, so that  foreigners 
will be called  on to provide  significant  financing  for many  years to come. 
If they become reluctant  to lend, then U.S. interest rates could soar, 
causing the dollar to collapse, and pushing the United States into a 
recessionary  balance-of-payments  crisis. 
The second recessionary  risk  starts  from  an almost  opposite  premise: 
that the United States will cut its budget deficit sharply, without a 
compensatory  fiscal  expansion  abroad,  and  thereby  throw  the world  into 
an aggregate  demand slump. U.S. Treasury  officials in the past three 
years  have strongly  urged  more  expansionary  fiscal  policies in Germany 
and  Japan  to avoid  this  outcome, and  influential  independent  economists 
have concurred  in this advice. 
This paper examines the prospects for reducing the U.S.  trade 
imbalance  and the plausibility  of the hard-landing  scenarios. A review 
of evidence on the sources of the trade  deficit  finds  that  the U.S. budget 
deficit  is the most important,  but not the only major,  source. Reducing 
the budget  deficit  would help to reduce  the trade  deficit, but even if the 
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budget  deficit  were eliminated,  a substantial  trade  deficit  would remain. 
Equally important,  an attempt  to reduce the trade deficit further  by a 
depreciating  exchange  rate  induced  by easier  monetary  policy would, at 
this stage, produce  inflation  with little benefit  on the current  account. 
A second finding  is that a hard landing  caused by a withdrawal  of 
investor  confidence  is implausible  in the next few years, though  certainly 
not impossible.  The experience  of the Latin  American  economies in the 
1980s  is proof enough  that  a crisis based on a loss of foreign  confidence 
can  indeed  occur, but  attempts  to draw  close analogies  between  the U.S. 
situation and that of Latin America are unconvincing. Furthermore, 
there is, at least as yet, little evidence of a rising  risk  premium  on dollar 
assets. The evidence to date is that, for good or bad, the U.S. deficits 
can be financed abroad for some time yet without triggering  steeply 
rising  interest  costs. 
The third  finding  of the paper  is that the global recessionary  risks of 
fiscal  tightening  in  the United  States  are  overblown.  Simulation  exercises 
suggest that U.S.  fiscal tightening need not be  balanced by fiscal 
expansions  abroad.  Even though  a U. S. fiscal  contraction  would  tend to 
reduce the demand  for European  and Japanese  exports, it would also 
reduce  world  interest  rates, thereby  spurring  internal  demand  in Europe 
and Japan.  On balance, the effects of U.S. budget  cutting  may well be 
expansionary  on the rest of the world,  and  can almost  surely  be made  so 
with  accommodating  monetary  policy  abroad.  Indeed,  the  current  "mini- 
boom" in Germany  and  Japan,  in which  growth  during  1987-88  has been 
significantly  higher  than  anticipated,  would appear  to show this mecha- 
nism  at work. 
Origins of the U.S. Trade Imbalance 
General  public opinion makes the fundamental  mistake of viewing 
trade  imbalances  as a reflection  of trade  policies and trade  distortions, 
rather  than as a reflection  of saving and investment behavior usually 
unrelated  to trade  policies. While  there may be cases in which a change 
in trade  policies can affect the trade  balance  (through  indirect  effects on 
saving and investment behavior), there is little reason to believe that 
growing  trade  or current  account imbalances  in the industrialized  coun- 
tries since the early 1980s  have had  anything  to do with changes  in trade 
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Table 1.  Current Account Imbalances, Industrial Economies,  1985-88 
1985  1986  1987  1988a 
Billions  Percent  Billionis Percent  Billions  Percent  Billions  Percent 
Economy  of dollars of GNP of dollars of GNP of dollars of GNP of dollars of GNP 
United  States  -116.5  -2.9  -141.3  -3.3  -160.7  -3.6  -150  -3.1 
Japan  49.2  3.7  85.8  4.4  87.0  3.6  85  2.9 
Germany  16.2  2.6  37.9  4.2  44.3  3.9  47  3.8 
G-7 countriesb  -51.7  -0.7  -  18.4  -0.2  -  44.6  -0.4  -  44  -0.4 
Smaller European 
countriesb  7.6  0.8  7.3  0.6  1.1  0.1  -  5  -0.3 
Total OECDb  -54.1  -0.6  -22.3  -0.2  -53.5  -0.4  -58  -0.4 
Source:  OECD  Econonmic  Outlook,  no. 43 (June  1988),  pp. 57-58, tables  28, 29, and 30. 
a. Projections. 
b. OECD  reports  country  data as a percent  of GNP or GDP depending  upon  conventional  measurement  within 
each country. 
As ample  research  has stressed, three  macroeconomic  developments 
adequately  account  for  the bulk  of the current  account  imbalances  shown 
in table 1. The first  is the divergence  of fiscal  policies in the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation  and Development  economies, primarily  the 
growth of U.S.  fiscal deficits and the reduction of fiscal deficits in 
Germany  and Japan; the second is the liberalization  of international 
capital  flows in several countries, especially Japan,  in the early 1980s; 
and the third  is the cutoff in lending  to the debtor  developing  countries, 
which forced a reduction  in the trade deficits in the debtor countries, 
and  thereby  resulted  in greater  trade  deficits  in the rest of the world. 
Nuriel  Roubini  and  I used a multicountry  simulation  model  to make  a 
rough  assessment of the quantitative  role of these factors  in accounting 
for the changes in trade imbalances in the United States and Japan 
between 1978 and 1985.1 The effects of the U.S.  trade balance, the 
Japanese  trade  balance,  and  the yen-dollar  real  exchange  rate  are shown 
in table 2. For each variable,  the actual change  shown records  the 1985 
value relative to its average value during 1978-80. Between 1979  and 
1985,  OECD estimates of the U.S. inflation-adjusted  structural  budget 
deficit  increased  by 4.4 percent  of U.S. GNP; the Japanese  full-employ- 
ment budget deficit decreased by 3.7 percent of GNP; and the full- 
employment  budget deficit in the rest of the OECD decreased by 0.5 
percent  of GNP. External  net lending  to the nonoil  developing  countries 
1. Jeffrey  D. Sachs and Nuriel  Roubini,  "Sources of Macroeconomic  Imbalances  in 
the World  Economy:  A Simulation  Approach,"  Working  Paper  2339  (National  Bureau  of 
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Table  2. Decomposition  of Changes  in the External  Balance  and Bilateral  Exchange 
Rate, United  States  and Japan, 1978-80  through  1985 
Percent 
Decomposition  of predicted  change 
Fiscal policies 
Actual Predicted United  Rest of  LDC  Monetary 
Variable  changea chanigeb  States  Japan  OECD lending policies 
U.S. trade  balancec  -  1.9  -  1.8  -  1.0  -0.2  - 0.0  -0.4  -0.2 
Japanese  trade  balancec  3.2  2.8  1.4  1.9  -0.1  -0.6  0.3 
U.S.-Japan  real exchange 
rated  24.0  28.0  11.8  10.6  - 0.0  -0.1  6.6 
Source:  Jeffrey  D. Sachs and  Nuriel  Roubini,  "Sources  of Macroeconomic  Imbalances  in the World  Economy:  A 
Simulation  Approach,"  Working  Paper  2339  (National  Bureau  of Economic  Research,  August 1987).  Original  data 
from  OECD  National  Income  Accounts. 
a. The actual  changes  measure  the 1985  value of the variable  compared  with the average  value of the variable 
during  1978-80. 
b. The  predicted  changes  come  from  a simulation  of the McKibbin-Sachs  model  (2), described  in the source,  based 
on changes in fiscal policies in the United States, Japan,  and the rest of the OECD  of the historically  observed 
magnitudes;  an exogenous reduction  in lending  to the LDCs; and offsetting  monetary  policies in the industrial 
countries. 
c. The trade  balance  is measured  as a percentage  of GNP. 
d. The real exchange  rate measures  the percentage  change  in the relative  consumer  price  indexes  of the United 
States  and  Japan,  corrected  for changes  in the nominal  exchange  rate.  The positive  value  signifies  a real  appreciation 
of the U.S. dollar. 
dropped, after 1982, by approximately 1.4 percent of U.S.  GNP, a 
development  that  is taken  to be exogenous in the simulation  exercise. 
We see from the table that the U.S. trade balance worsened by 1.9 
percent of U.S.  GNP during  this period, while the model predicts a 
deterioration  of 1.8 percent of GNP based on the four changes just 
mentioned.  Just over half the change in the U.S. external  position (1.0 
percent of GNP) is attributed  to the growth in the U.S. fiscal deficit; 
another  0.2 percent  is attributed  to the Japanese  fiscal contraction;  and 
another  0.4 percent  of GNP to the LDC lending  cutoff. Finally, another 
0.2 percent is ascribed to the combined effects of monetary policy 
changes  in each of the regions  in the model.2  In the case of the Japanese 
trade  surplus,  which rises by 3.2 percent  of GNP, the model  predicts  an 
2. The  underlying  monetary  policy  assumed  in  the simulation  exercise  is that  monetary 
policy  leans  against  fiscal  policy  to keep  an overall  macroeconomic  balance.  In the United 
States, tight  monetary  policy during  1978-85  balances  the expansionary  fiscal policy; in 
Japan  and the rest of the OECD, loose monetary  policy balances  the effects of the tight 
fiscal  policy. In  any  event, monetary  policy  has  little  effect  on the external  balance,  a point 
to which I shall return,  though  monetary  policy has an important  effect on the level of 
internal  economic activity and on the overall level of exports and imports  (but not on 
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improvement  of 2.8 percent based on the fiscal and monetary  policy 
changes,  of which 1.9 percent  is ascribed  to the Japanese  fiscal contrac- 
tion, and 1.4  percent  to the U.S. fiscal expansion. 
Capital  market  liberalization,  especially in Japan  after 1980, comes 
into these estimates indirectly. Without  the liberalization  of Japanese 
capital  movements,  the Japanese  trade  imbalances  would  not have been 
sustained. The Japanese fiscal contraction for the same period, for 
example,  would have reduced  domestic interest  rates in Japan,  thereby 
inducing  an increase in Japanese domestic investment (and perhaps a 
fall in private  saving), rather  than a capital  outflow  and a trade  surplus. 
The yen would not have experienced its 24 percent real depreciation 
between 1978-80  and 1985. 
The estimates in table 2 examine the changes in external balances 
between 1978-80  and 1985.  Between 1985  and 1988, the U.S. external 
balance turned even more negative (fairly sharply in 1986 and 1987, 
before improving  slightly  in 1988).  It would seem that  these subsequent 
changes cannot be well explained by fiscal policy changes after 1985, 
since the U.S. budget  deficit  has declined  as a percentage  of GNP while 
the external  deficit  has grown. As in the first  half of the 1980s,  there is 
no evidence that  shifts  in trade  policy, either  actual  or anticipated,  in the 
United States or abroad  played a role. As an accounting  matter, the 
current account deficit (equal to national investment minus national 
saving) deteriorated  further  because private saving, mainly  household 
saving,  fell sharply,  even as public  saving  increased  (that  is, became  less 
negative).  The household  saving  rate  fell from  an average  of 6.8 percent 
of disposable  income  during  1980-84  to 3.9 percent  of disposable  income 
in 1987.3 
Some of the decline  in the private  saving  rate  might  be an endogenous 
response to macroeconomic  policy. For example, private  saving might 
have declined to some extent because of the fall in interest rates and 
rising  stock market  values after 1985,  which in turn  resulted  in part  from 
expansionary  monetary  policy and tightening  fiscal policy. It seems, 
however, that much of the decline cannot easily be accounted for in 
these terms.4  In any event, this fall in private  saving  rates  seems to have 
3. Data  are  from  OECD  Economic  Outlook,  no. 43 (June  1988),  table  R12, p. 181. 
4. See Lawrence  Summers  and  Chris  Carroll,  "Why  Is U.S. Saving  So Low?"  BPEA, 
2:1987,  pp. 607-45, for a detailed  description  of the puzzling  decline  in private  saving,  as 
well as the  general  inability  of standard  explanations  to account  for it. 644  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1988 
contributed  to the recent  deterioration  of the external  balance  above and 
beyond  the contribution  of the budget  deficit. 
Budget Deficit Reductions and the External Balance 
The data  in table 3 provide  further  general  evidence that  fiscal  policy 
changes  have been important,  but not one-for-one,  determinants  of the 
shifts  in external  imbalances  since the late 1970s.  Countries  with  growing 
budget  deficits  after  1979  experienced,  on average,  largercurrent  account 
deficits. Since the current  account  equals  national  saving  minus  national 
investment,  which  in turn  equals  the financial  balance  of the government 
(government  saving minus government  investment)  plus the financial 
balance  of the private  sector (private  saving  minus  private  investment), 
changes  in the government  financial  imbalance  will translate  into current 
account changes if the private saving-investment  balance remains  un- 
changed.  In general,  the private  balance  will respond  partially  to offset 
changes  in the public  sector balance,  but  in general  the offset will be less 
than  complete.5 
A simple  regression  of the change in the current  account  position on 
the change in fiscal balance, using the data of table 3, suggests that a 
budget  deficit  increase  of 1.0  percent  of GNP  was associated,  on average, 
with a deterioration  of the current  account  of 0.66 percent  of GNP. With 
CA  the current  account  surplus  (and -  CA  the deficit),  and  D the  financial 
deficit  of the public  sector, we have 
d(-  CA/GNP)  =  0.72  +  0.66 d(D/GNP), 
(1.15)  (2.91) 
RI  =  0.55, 
with  d(-  CA/GNP)  and  d(D/GNP)  referring  to  the  changes  of  the 
variables  for the average  of 1985-86  relative  to the average  of 1978-79. 
While the offset coefficient of 0.66 should not be taken as a structural 
5. Of course, in the theory  of Ricardian-Barro  equivalence,  some kinds  of changes  in 
the public  sector  balance  are predicted  to lead to exactly offsetting  changes  in the private 
sector balance. For example, a cut in current  taxes that leads to larger  current  budget 
deficits  and higher  future  taxes is hypothesized  to increase  private  saving  as households 
anticipate  larger  future  tax liabilities.  In effect, households  fully save, rather  than  spend, 
the  increased  income  resulting  from  the  tax  cut, in  anticipation  of their  future  tax liabilities. Jeffrey D. Sachs  645 
Table 3.  Changes in General Government Financial Balances and Current Account 
Imbalances, Industrial Countries, 1978-86a 
Percent of GNP 
Change in 
government  Change in 
financial  current 
Country  balance  account 
United States  - 3.65  - 2.75 
Japan  4.15  3.65 
Germany  1.32  3.05 
France  -1.60  -0.97 
United Kingdom  0.95  0.30 
Italy  -1.90  - 2.00 
Canada  - 3.70  0.85 
Source:  OECD Economic  Outlook, no. 43, tables  30, R13, and R20, pp. 58,  182, 189. 
a.  The  change  in the  government  financial balance  measures  the change  in the  ratio of the general government 
financial balance as a percentage  of GNP or GDP. The change is calculated  as the average value of the ratio for the 
years  1985-86,  minus the average value for 1978-79.  The change in the current account  is measured  similarly. 
estimate (especially since the offset is likely to differ  across countries), 
the equation  clearly highlights  the statistical  correlation  between shifts 
in budget  policy and shifts in the external  balance  in the past decade. 
In  the simulation  model  underlying  table  2, a sustained,  bond-financed 
U.S.  fiscal expansion (an increase in federal spending on goods and 
services)  worsens the U.S. trade  balance  in the year  of the expansion  by 
0.34 percent of GNP and by an average of 0.31 percent of GNP over 
three  years, with a third-year  effect of 0.29 percent  of GNP. Large-scale 
macroeconometric  models  give diverse  estimates  of the offset in the case 
of the United  States, but  the estimate  of 0.31 is in the middle  of the range. 
Table  4 shows the estimated  effects of a fiscal  expansion  in four  popular 
models of international  macroeconomic interdependence.  The third- 
year effect ranges from 0.51 percent of GNP to 0.29 percent, with an 
unweighted  average  effect of 0.40 percent  of GNP. While  these estimates 
have a moderate  dispersion (and reflect the professional  uncertainties 
on this subject),  they all show a trade-off  of about  0.5 or less. 
Thus,  the  fall  in public  saving  is matched  by a rise  in private  saving,  with  no overall  change 
in the current  account  balance. I do not adopt  this view, consistent  with a considerable 
body of negative  theoretical  and empirical  evidence. For a critical  survey of the theory, 
see B.  Douglas Burnheim, "Ricardian  Equivalence: An Evaluation of Theory and 
Evidence,"  in Stanley Fischer,  ed.,  NBER Macroeconomics  Annual,  1987 (MIT Press, 
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Table 4.  Simulations of Effect of U.S.  Fiscal Expansion on U.S.  Current Accounta 
Percent of GNP 
Year 
Model  1  3 
Japanese  Economic  Planning Agency 
World Model  -0.08  -  0.40 
Federal Reserve  Multicountry Model  -0.37  -0.51 
Organization for Economic  Cooperation 
and Development  Interlink  -0.37  -0.39 
McKibbin-Sachs  Global Model (2)  -0.34  -0.29 
Source:  For the first three models,  John F.  Helliwell,  "The Effects  of Fiscal  Policy  on International Imbalances: 
Japan and the United States,"  Working Paper 2650 (National  Bureau of Economic  Research,  July 1988, table 4); for 
the  McKibbin-Sachs  Global  Model  (2),  Sachs  and Roubini,  "Sources  of  Macroeconomic  Imbalances  in the World 
Economy." 
a.  The  table measures  the effect  of a  I percent of GNP  increase  in fiscal expenditure  on goods  and services,  on 
the current account  as a percent of GNP.  (In the case  of the McKibbin-Sachs  model,  the effect  is measured for the 
trade balance  rather than the current account  balance.) 
There  are several reasons  for the less than  one-for-one  link between 
changes in the budget deficits and changes in the trade balance.6 
Basically, a  tightening of  fiscal policy (taken here to  be  a  cut in 
government  spending  with unchanged  tax policy, and thus lower bond- 
financed  budget  deficits)  induces  a rise in private  investment  rates and  a 
fall in private  saving  rates. Private  investment  increases  as lower budget 
deficits lead to a reduction of  interest rates and a crowding-in of 
investment.  Private  saving  rates  fall for cyclical reasons. The decline in 
government spending also leads to a temporary  decline in national 
income (relative to a baseline path). Since households perceive the 
output  decline  as temporary,  they temporarily  reduce  their  rate  of saving 
in response to the reduction  of output, in order to smooth the path of 
consumption.  Overall,  therefore,  the effect of higher  government  saving 
on the current  account  is partially  offset by a fall in private  saving  and a 
rise in private  investment. 
The fairly  modest  effect of fiscal  policy on the current  account  deficit 
has an important  implication  consistent with the findings  of table 2. The 
U.S. fiscal expansion was only one of the reasons for the widening  of 
6. Of  course, the observed  linkages  between  budget  deficits  and  the trade  balance  will 
depend  on the precise  nature  of the  fiscal  policy  changes  that  are  undertaken.  For  example, 
the effect of changes in bond-financed  government  spending  on the trade balance will 
depend  on whether  the spending  changes are perceived  to be temporary  or permanent, 
since the expected  duration  of the change  will affect  how households  perceive  the change 
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the U. S. current  account  deficit.  Completely  eliminating the U. S. budget 
deficit, other things being equal, would remove no more than half the 
current  external  gap. During 1987:2-1988:2  the current  account deficit 
was 3.6 percent  of GNP;  the fiscal  deficit, 3.4 percent  of GNP. Applying 
a coefficient  of 0.40 (the average  of the four models reported  in table 4) 
to the effect of the budget  deficit on the current  account deficit means 
that  closing  the budget  deficit  would  reduce  the external  deficit  from  3.6 
percent  of GNP to approximately  2.2 percent  of GNP, or to about $100 
billion  in 1988. 
Balancing the U.S.  current account will therefore require policy 
actions or other economic events (for example, a strong recovery of 
household  saving)  beyond balancing  the U.S. budget. Fiscal policies in 
other countries are unlikely to make a big difference. The effects of 
foreign  fiscal actions on the U.S. external  balance  are small (as table 2 
shows, a 3.7 percent  fiscal contraction  in Japan  between 1978  and 1985 
worsened  the predicted  U.S. current  account  deficit  by only 0.2 percent 
of GNP). Moreover,  the fiscal  contractions  in  Germany  and  Japan  during 
the 1980s are unlikely to be reversed. The initial fiscal conditions in 
Germany  and Japan at the end of the 1970s were at the time widely 
regarded  as having  been undesirable  and  unsustainable,  and  there  is little 
interest  now in returning  to those larger  deficits.7 
In conclusion, while the U.S. budget  deficit is a central  factor in the 
large current  account deficit, even its complete elimination,  however 
unlikely, would not by itself restore external balance in the United 
States. At the core, the U.S. external  imbalance  is a structural  feature 
of the U.S. economy also reflecting  the extraordinarily  low net saving 
rate in the private sector, and particularly  in the household sector, 
combined  with sufficiently  favorable  investment  prospects to induce a 
continuing  inflow  of foreign  capital. 
The Exchange Rate and the External Deficit 
So far  I have  focused on the saving-investment  balance  in interpreting 
the U.S. current  account imbalance,  attributing  the external deficit to 
7. In Japan, the general  government  financial  balance in 1979  was a deficit of 4.7 
percent  of GNP  (significantly  larger  than  the current  U.S. budget  deficit),  and  the German 
deficit  was 2.5 percent  of GNP. In both  countries,  the ratio  of public  net debt  to GNP had 
risen sharply  in the late 1970s, to the considerable  concern of policymakers  in both 
countries.  See OECD  Economic  Outlook,  no. 43 (June  1988),  table  R13. 648  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1988 
the low saving rate, which in turn results from large budget deficits 
combined  with a chronically  low and  declining  private  saving  rate. How 
does this interpretation  square with the conventional  view that it was 
the strong  dollar  during  1980-85  that caused  the large  trade  deficits, and 
that  a weak dollar  now will make  the trade  deficit  disappear? 
The answer  is that  the dollar  exchange  rate  is an endogenous  variable 
and therefore  cannot be considered  a cause of movements in the trade 
balance.  As shown  later,  the dollar  appreciated  in  the  early  1980s  because 
of high U.S. interest  rates, which were in turn  caused by the large  U.S. 
fiscal deficits  coupled  with tight  monetary  policy.8  It was the monetary- 
fiscal mix that was behind both the appreciation  of the dollar and the 
rising external deficits. Similarly, a change in policy mix since 1985 
(easier money, combined  with some actual and some anticipated  tight- 
ening of fiscal policy) can explain  much of the subsequent  depreciation 
of the dollar. 
Stressing  the more  fundamental  role  of fiscal  policy for the movement 
both  of the exchange  rate  and  of external  balance  helps avoid  one fallacy 
common  in policy discussion. It is sometimes  suggested  that  the United 
States needs only a further fall of the dollar to balance its external 
accounts; how that decline in the dollar is to be brought  about is left 
unspecified.  But the source of the dollar  decline is crucial  in assessing 
how it would affect the development  of the trade  balance.  To the extent 
that the dollar depreciates because of tighter fiscal policy, the effect 
would  be a further  improvement  in the trade  balance  (on the order  of 0.4 
times the change in fiscal policy). By contrast, to the extent that the 
dollar  depreciation  is induced  by a monetary  expansion,  the benefits  for 
the trade  balance  would  be much smaller,  and  perhaps  nonexistent. 
Consider  what happens  to the trade balance if the Federal Reserve 
eases monetary  policy to drive  the dollar  lower. A monetary  expansion 
causes the domestic interest rate to decline and induces an incipient 
capital outflow, causing the dollar to depreciate. The weaker dollar 
boosts exports and thereby GNP (assuming initial excess  capacity), 
which  in  turn  causes  national  saving  to rise  (since  household  consumption 
8. A fiscal  expansion  induces  a dollar  appreciation  by causing  domestic  interest  rates 
to rise, thereby  inducing  an incipient  capital  inflow,  as wealthholders  attempt  to shift  out 
of foreign  assets to buy higher-yield  domestic  assets. The dollar  then  appreciates  until  the 
point where the interest  rate differential  between the United States and abroad  is just 
balanced  by an expected  future  depreciation  of the dollar. Jeffrey D. Sachs  649 
Table 5.  Simulations of Effects of U.S.  Monetary Expansion on the Effective 
U.S.  Exchange Rate and U.S.  Current Accounta 
Current  account  Nominal 
(change as  exchange rateb 
Model  percent of GNP)  (percent  change) 
Year  Year 
1  3  1  3 
Japanese  Economic  Planning  Agency 
World  Model  - 0.02  0.02  -  1.0  -  1.7 
Federal  Reserve Multicountry  Model  -0.03  -0.01  -  1.7  -  1.5 
Organization  for Economic  Cooperation 
and Development  Interlink  -0.11  0.01  -0.9  -0.6 
McKibbin-Sachs  Global  Model (2)  -0.00  0.01  -  1.4  -  1.1 
Source:  For the first three  models,  see  Ralph C.  Bryant and others,  "Estimates  of the Consequences  of  Policy 
Actions,"  in Ralph C. Bryant and others, eds.,  Empirical MacroecononmicsforInterdepenidenttEconiomies (Brookings, 
1988),  tables  4-15  and  4-16,  pp. 78-79.  The  original  data  for the current  account  record  the change  in absolute  billions 
of dollars,  rather  than  as a percent  of GNP. The conversion  is made  using  a baseline  value  of GNP  of $3,900  billion 
(1985  value) for year 1,.  and $4,400  billion  for year 3. For the McKibbin-Sachs  Global  Model (2), see Sachs and 
Roubini,  "Sources  of Macroeconomic  Imbalances  in the World  Economy,"  table 7. (The nominal  exchange  rate 
must  be calculated  from  the table,  using  the reported  values  of the real  exchange  rate  and  the inflation  rate.) 
a. The table  records  the effect of a permanent  I percent  increase  in the U.S. money  supply  (Ml) on the current 
account  (change  as percent  of baseline  GNP)  and on the exchange  rate  (percent  change). 
b. Negative  sign signifies  depreciation. 
will rise less than  the temporary,  money-induced  increase  in output).  At 
the same time, the lower domestic interest rates will cause domestic 
investment  to rise. 
Because the external balance will change according  to the rise of 
saving  minus  the rise of investment,  a weaker  dollar  brought  about  by a 
monetary  expansion  has an ambiguous  effect on the trade  balance.  Both 
saving and investment tend to rise, and the trade balance may either 
improve  or worsen. Put in more conventional  terms, the weaker  dollar 
resulting  from the monetary  expansion  induces a rise in exports, but it 
also causes a rise in imports, since domestic spending  is increased  by 
lower domestic  interest  rates. 
Table  5 reports  the effects of money expansion  on the exchange  rate 
and  trade  balance  in the same simulation  models  reported  in table  4. The 
point of this section is strongly  borne out: while a monetary  expansion 
is predicted  to lead to a dollar  depreciation  in each of the models, the 
effect on the trade balance is generally  small, and actually negative in 
the  first  year,  and  of ambiguous  sign  in  the third  year.  In  the Multicountry 
Model of the Federal Reserve Board Staff, the dollar depreciation  is 
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year, while in other models it is associated with an improvement.  The 
overall  message  is crucial,  but not widely understood.  Driving  down the 
dollar  through  a low-interest  monetary  policy improves  the trade  balance 
little, if at all. 
As I will point out later, much  of the decline in the dollar  since 1985 
has resulted from a combination of easy monetary policy and the 
expectation  of tighter  fiscal  policy, rather  than  from  an actual  tightening 
of fiscal policy. This point helps to explain  why the improvement  in the 
external  trade  balance  has  been so modest,  despite  the sharp  depreciation 
of the dollar. 
The U.S. current  account  deficit  has declined  from  approximately  3.3 
percent  of GNP in 1986  to an estimated  3.1 percent  of GNP in 1988.  The 
part of the depreciation  due to monetary expansion has led to rapid 
growth,  but little improvement  in the trade  balance. The part  due to an 
actual  cut in the fiscal  deficit  has been small.  With  the fiscal  deficit  having 
declined by about 1.5 percent of GNP between 1986 and 1988, the 
estimated  trade balance effect is predicted  to be only about 0.4 x  1.5 
percent  of GNP, or about  0.6 percent  of GNP, or slightly  larger  than  the 
current  account  gains  to date. 
Will Foreign Investors Close the External Deficit? 
One theme of  the hard-landing  school is  that if the U.S.  fiscal 
authorities  do not close the budget deficit sufficiently  to balance the 
external  deficit,  the external  creditors  of the United States will close the 
external deficit for us, by reducing  the inflow of foreign capital.9  The 
concern is that such a cutoff in lending would likely be disorderly, 
causing  a largejump  in  interest  rates  and  a sharp  fall  of the dollar,  thereby 
provoking  a recession in the United States, combined  with a jump in 
inflation  following  the collapse of the currency.  Many  commentators  in 
the past two years have viewed the steep depreciation  of the dollar  that 
has already  occurred  as the first  manifestation  of the feared  hard  landing. 
9.  This risk has been stressed by Stephen Marris, Deficits  and the Dollar:  The World 
Economy  at Risk, Policy  Analyses  in International  Economics  no. 14  (Washington,  D.C.: 
Institute  for  International  Economics,  1985);  and  by Martin  Feldstein,  "The  Stock  Market 
Decline and Economic  Policy," testimony  to the Banking  Committee  of the U.S. House 
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But while  the theoretical  possibility  of this kind  of crisis clearly  exists, a 
quantitative  assessment of the risks shows that such fears are exagger- 
ated, at least for the next few years. 
The theoretical case is straightforward.  A current account deficit 
depends  on the availability  of foreign  financing.  With  a zero net capital 
inflow,  no external  current  account deficit  is possible. In the event that 
foreign  creditors  stop lending  to U.S. residents, the U.S. residents  can 
continue to run current  account deficits only so long as they can run 
down accumulated  gross assets-assets  held abroad  and  official  foreign 
exchange  reserves. Eventually,  as the gross asset stock is reduced,  the 
current  account must come into balance, and even move into surplus  if 
an amortization  of foreign  liabilities  is required  by the foreign  creditors 
(and  if there is no default  on these obligations). 
Assuming  that the budget  deficit  remains  large, the cutoff in foreign 
lending leads to a sharp increase in domestic interest rates, until the 
private  net financial  position  (SP  IP) rises sufficiently,  through  lower 
investment spending  and higher saving, to finance the budget deficit 
entirely out of surplus private domestic funds. The cutoff in foreign 
funds thereby converts the effect of the budget deficit from one of 
external crowding  out (deterioration  of the current  account deficit) to 
the traditional  closed-economy  case of internal crowding  out of invest- 
ment. 
At the moment  that  the foreign  inflow  ceases, there is a steep drop  in 
demand  for domestic goods and a sharp  real dollar  depreciation,  in the 
sense both of a reduction in the price of domestic goods relative to 
foreign  goods and  of a reduction  in  the price  of nontradable  goods relative 
to tradable  goods. It is likely that  the collapse  in internal  demand  caused 
by the rise  in  domestic  interest  rates  will  lead  to unemployment.  Workers 
laid  off by the declining  nontradables  sector are unlikely  to be absorbed 
instantly  into export  and  import-competing  sectors.  10  Part  of the adjust- 
ment mechanism of  the  sudden balancing of  the current account, 
10. There are several reasons why the adjustment  process is likely to result in a 
transitional  period  of (perhaps  high)  unemployment.  The sudden  drop  in internal  demand 
requires  a reallocation  of resources  from  nontradables  production  to tradables  production. 
This  resource  reallocation  generally  requires  a fairly  sharp  drop  in real wages to induce 
the tradables  sector firms  to hire  the labor  laid  off by the nontradables  sector. Assuming 
any form of real wage resistance  (or nominal  wage rigidity  combined  with a monetary 
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therefore,  is likely to be a steep drop in domestic output and a rise in 
unemployment. 
The case of Mexico in 1982-83  is a classic example  of a hard  landing. 
(Almost any Latin American country in the 1980s would serve the 
purposes  of illustration.)  During  1979-82, the Mexican  government  ran 
enormous  budget deficits, reaching 14 percent of GDP in 1981, on the 
eve of the crisis.11  These deficits contributed  to large current  account 
deficits  of more  than  5 percent  of GDP  in 1981.  Through  the combination 
of a steep rise in world  interest  rates, weakening  oil prices, and  growing 
skepticism  over Mexican  fiscal  management,  private  foreign  investment 
shifted remarkably  from a net capital  inflow  of medium-  and long-term 
funds  of $11.5  billion  in 1981,  to $6.1 billion  in 1982,  and  only $2.7  billion 
in 1983.  Mexico tried  to roll  over existing  debts in the spring  of 1982,  but 
found itself unable to attract the desired loans. It announced in the 
summer  of 1982  that it would therefore  be unable  to meet its principal 
obligations  in the short  run, and that announcement  in turn  provoked  a 
virtually  instantaneous  and complete  withdrawal  of new credits. 
The cutoff in foreign lending had the expected effect. The current 
account moved from  a deficit  of $6.2 billion  in 1982  to a surplus  of $5.3 
billion  in 1983.12  The currency  collapsed, inflation  accelerated  sharply, 
and  Mexican  GNP declined  5 percent  in real  terms  in 1983. 
Is the United States Next? 
The plausibility  of the hard-landing  scenario is often argued  on the 
basis of three  observations.  First, the U.S. fiscal and external  positions 
are serious  enough  to generate  profound  external  concern  and  reticence 
to lend. Second, even if the budget  deficit is not large relative to U.S. 
GNP, the foreign financing  required  (currently  $150 billion a year) is 
large  relative  to the rest of the world. Third,  the sharp  fall of the dollar 
since its peak in 1985 shows the dwindling  of the foreign appetite for 
dollar-denominated  assets. All three  arguments  are dubious. 
11. The data  and  descriptions  for Mexico are based  on Ed Buffie, "Economic  Policy 
and Foreign  Debt in Mexico," forthcoming  in Jeffrey  Sachs, ed., Developing Country 
Debt and Economic Performance:  Country Studies (University  of Chicago Press,  1989). 
12. The surplus  resulted  from the fact that the Mexican  monetary  authorities  accu- 
mulated  foreign  exchange  reserves in 1983,  raising  them  from  a totally depleted  level in 
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Analogies  between  the United States and Latin  America  are mislead- 
ing. The U.S. situation,  for example, differs significantly  from that of 
Mexico in 1981.  The Mexican current  account deficit was more than 5 
percent  of GNP, compared  with a U.S. current  account  deficit  this year 
of about 3 percent of GNP. More importantly,  the Mexican terms of 
trade were deteriorating  sharply  as a result of the fall of oil prices in 
1982,  thereby  causing  a sharp  deterioration  of the trade  balance  and  the 
budget  deficit. The Mexican net-debt-to-GNP  ratio (measured  as gross 
external  debt minus  foreign  exchange reserves) was on the order  of 50 
percent  of GNP, compared  with  the U.S. net  foreign  investment  position 
at the end of 1987  of around  8 percent  of GNP.  13 
Perhaps  most important,  the net indebtedness  of the Mexican  public 
sector was increasing  rapidly.  The public sector deficit in 1981  was on 
the order  of 14  percent  of GNP, and  the inflation-adjusted  deficit  was on 
the order  of 11  percent  of GNP, which  was leading  to an explosion of the 
ratio  of public sector debt to public sector revenue.  14 On the prevailing 
policy path of 1981-82, it was evident that the Mexican public sector 
could experience  profound  financial  distress. 
In the United States, on the contrary, the net indebtedness of the 
public  sector has approximately  stabilized  as a percentage  of GNP, and 
as a percentage  of annual  government  revenues, even on a projection  of 
13. It is probably  true,  however,  that  standard  ways of reporting  the net  debt  positions 
of the United  States and  of Latin  America  overstate  the differences  between  the regions. 
The  Mexican  net debt  position  reported  in the text does not count  the net foreign  assets of 
the Mexican  private  sector that  were accumulated  through  heavy capital  flight  in the late 
1970s  and early 1980s,  while the U.S. net foreign  investment  position  does (in principle) 
count the net foreign assets of U.S. residents abroad. Buffie, "Economic Policy and 
Foreign Debt in Mexico," makes a rough correction  of this problem, by measuring 
Mexico's net debt as the cumulative  dollar  value of current  account  deficits  for Mexico. 
On this alternative  measure,  Mexico's net international  indebtedness  at the end of 1982 
was on the order  of $52  billion  (rather  than  a conventional  measure  of net debt of around 
$87  billion),  or about  30 percent  of GNP. There  is also a long  and  complex  debate  over the 
accuracy  of the  U.S. data.  On  the  one side, U.S. assets  held  abroad  are  probably  understated 
(thus  exaggerating  the U.S. net debt  position),  since foreign  direct  investment  is valued  at 
historical  cost  rather  than  market  value.  On  the  other  hand,  there  are  surely  large  unreported 
foreign holdings of assets in the United States (thus understating  the U.S.  net debt 
position), as evidenced by the errors and omissions account of the U.S. balance of 
payments  during  the past  decade. 
14. The inflation-adjusted  deficit measure subtracts  from the conventional  deficit 
measure  the  inflation  component  of interest  payments  on the  internal  debt.  The  calculation 
for Mexico  was made  by Buffie, "Economic  Policy and Foreign  Debt in Mexico," table 
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continuing  budget  deficits of about $150 billion a year for the next five 
years. According to the Congressional Budget Office outlook as of 
February  1988,  the federal  debt held by the public  reached  43.0 percent 
of GNP in 1987  and is projected  to reach 43.4 percent of GNP in 1993 
under current  budget policy. The reason for the stability in the ratio 
should  be clear. With  nominal  GNP projected  to grow  about  6.5 percent 
a year, the nominal  debt itself can grow at the same rate without an 
increase  in the debt-GNP  ratio. Since the federal  debt was 43 percent  of 
GNP in 1987,  it can grow each year by 2.8 percent  of GNP (6.5 x 0.43), 
or about  $130  billion  in 1988,  without  an increase  in the debt-GNP  ratio. 
Since the deficit after 1990 is projected to be somewhat less than 2.8 
percent of GNP, the projected  ratio of debt to GNP begins to fall very 
slightly  after  1990.15 
Thus, the burden  of the external  indebtedness  of the United States, 
and  of the  public  debt,  is under  broad  control  compared  with  the  explosive 
situation  in Mexico and many other Latin American  countries  in 1982. 
But  the argument  is sometimes  made  that  even if the external  and  internal 
debt and deficits  are manageable  relative  to U.S. GNP, the amounts  of 
foreign financing  implied  by the current  situation  are nonetheless too 
large from the point of view of the world economy. Will the world 
continue  to lend  the United  States $150  billion  a year  without  demanding 
a sharp  increase  in interest  rates? 
Skeptics  point  out that  the implied  capital  flows are  far  larger,  relative 
to the size of the world  economy, than  anything  experienced  in the past 
30 years. But the historical  record  is misleading  on this point. Until the 
1980s, capital controls were sufficiently  extensive to bar a sustained 
capital  transfer  among  the industrial  countries. Effective controls were 
in place in Japan,  the United Kingdom,  France, Italy, and most of the 
smaller  European  countries.  By 1987,  most  controls  had  been  eliminated. 
Moreover, the European community is now committed to complete 
internal  capital market  liberalization  by 1992, which, when combined 
with the free international  capital mobility in the largest European 
countries, will effectively integrate  the entire European  Community  in 
the world  pool of savings. 
Table 6 shows the U.S.  budget and current account deficits as a 
percentage  of a conservatively  estimated  pool of saving  and  income  that 
15. See Congressional  Budget  Office,  The  Economnic  andBudget  Outlook: Fiscal  Years 
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Table 6.  U.S.  Budget and Current Account Deficits relative to Foreign Saving 
and Income, 1987 
Billions  of dollars  except as noted 
Gross national  Gross domestic 
Item  saving  product 
Japan  774  2,375 
European  Community  822  3,928 
Total  1,596  6,303 
U.S. budget  deficit  as 
percent  of total  9.5  2.4 
U.S. current  account 
as percent  of total  9.6  2.4 
Source:  OECD  National  Income  Accounts.  Yen  figures converted  to dollars using average  annual exchange  rate 
as reported in the International Monetary Fund, Internzationial  Financial  Statistics. 
ignores OPEC savers and includes only  Japan and the  European 
Community.  In  flow  terms,  the 1987  U.S. external  deficit  was 9.6 percent 
of the combined  annual  saving  of Japan  and the European  Community. 
While financing the U.S.  budget deficit and external deficit is  not 
necessarily  a desirable  use of world  savings, it would seem at least to be 
a feasible option. 
Interpreting the Decline in the Dollar 
The viewpoint just presented is optimistic about the ability of the 
United States to finance  its external  deficits in the next few years. An 
important  competing  view holds that the decline of the dollar  in recent 
years is itself grounds  for pessimism. Martin  Feldstein, among others, 
contends that the decline of the dollar  has resulted  from the increasing 
reluctance  of foreigners  to hold dollar-denominated  claims, which has 
therefore  reduced the private capital inflows into the United States, 
causing a sharply  falling dollar.16 In this interpretation,  sharply  rising 
interest  rates will be needed to encourage  the requisite  flows of capital 
from  abroad,  unless the U.S. budget  deficit  is decisively cut.17 Without 
a sudden  hard  landing,  as in Mexico, there  will at least be a progressive 
reduction  in domestic demand through  an escalation of real interest 
rates. 
16. Feldstein,  "Stock Market  Decline." 
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To  examine  this  argument,  let us begin  with  a simple  model  of exchange 
rate  determination.  '8 Let r be the expected real  interest  rate  on a default- 
free  one-period  dollar-denominated  bond, and  let r*  be the expected real 
interest  rate on a one-year  foreign-denominated  bond. Let P and P* be 
the domestic  and  foreign  price  levels, and  letp andp* be the logarithms. 
Thus, r  =  i  -  (pe,  -  p,) and  r*  =  i* -  (p*el  -  p*), where  (pe,+I  -  p,) 
is the expected inflation  of the domestic prices. The real  exchange  rate, 
X, is defined  as EP*IP,  where E is in units of dollars  per unit of foreign 
currency.  Let x and  y be the logarithm  of the real  and nominal  exchange 
rate, respectively. Note that a rise in x is then a real depreciation  of the 
dollar.  Let xe be the expected value of x in n years. 
Assuming risk-neutral  foreign investors, interest arbitrage  across 
national  borders  requires 
(1)  (yt+)e  =  yt  +  it  -  it* 
Using the definition  of real interest  rates, and the fact that  xt  +I  -  xt 
Yt+1  -  yt +  (P*+1 -  Pt*) -  (pt+1 -  pt), yields 
(2)  (Xt+1)e  =  xt +  rt -  rt* 
Summing  over equation  2 for periods  t until  t + n yields 
(3)  (Xt+n)e  =  xt  +  n (re -  r  *e 
where rn  is the n-period expected real interest rate, expressed as an 
annual  yield, as of time t. To get from  equation  2 to equation  3, I use the 
assumption  of risk neutrality  and rational  expectations to write the n- 
period yield as the average of the expected yields on the one-period 
bonds between time t and time t +  n. 19 
The model is completed  by assuming  that n is large  enough (say five 
to ten years), so that  by n years the real exchange  rate  is expected to be 
18. See Jeffrey  D. Sachs, "The Dollar  and  the Policy Mix: 1985,"  BPEA, 1:1985,  pp. 
117-47;  and Peter  Hooper  and Catherine  Mann, "The U.S. External  Deficit:  Its Causes 
and Consequences,"  in The U.S.  External Deficit:  Causes,  Consequences,  and Cures, 
Proceedings  of the twelfth  annual  economic  policy conference,  Federal  Reserve Bank  of 
St. Louis  (Boston:  Kluwer  Academic  Publishing,  forthcoming,  1989). 
19. Specifically, 
n 
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back at its equilibrium  level. Suppose  further  that the expected equilib- 
rium level of x is a constant,  xc.  For example, as Paul Krugman  has 
recently argued on both theoretical and empirical grounds, the real 
exchange rate might return in the long run to a given rate based on 
purchasing  power parity considerations.20  Then, equation 3 can be 
written  as 
(4)  xt = xc -  n (r  e  -  r,  *e) 
Now suppose that a divergent  macroeconomic  policy mix between the 
United States and the rest of the world  leads to a rise in the interest  rate 
differential  of, say, 6 percentage  points (as was the experience  between 
1978 and 1984), and say that n is  six years. Then, equation 4 would 
predict  that  the 6 percentage  point  rise in the interest  differential  in favor 
of the United States would cause a dollar  appreciation  of 36 percent. 
This view of determinants  of exchange rates therefore stresses the 
importance  of long-term real  interest  rate  differentials  and  the long-term 
constancy  of the real  exchange  rate. In  turn,  it is macroeconomic  policies 
(for example, the expansionary  U.S.  fiscal policy combined with the 
contractionary  Japanese fiscal policy) that contribute to the shifting 
interest rate differential.  This simple model does remarkably  well in 
accounting  for the overall  movement  of the dollar  in the past decade, as 
shown in figure 1.21 
The figure  shows the real  interest  rate  differential  of the United States 
and  a weighted  average  of other  countries,  together  with the movement 
in the log of the real exchange rate of the dollar vis-a-vis those other 
currencies.22  (The figure  uses -x  = p  -  e  -  p*  on the exchange rate 
axis, so that a rise in the index signifies  a real appreciation.)  The real 
interest  rate for each country  is calculated  simply  as the long-term  rate 
minus the CPI inflation  rate of that month over the same month the 
20. See Paul Krugman,  "Differences  in Income Elasticities  and Secular  Trends in 
Exchange  Rates," presented  at the International  Seminar  on Macroeconomics  of the 
National  Bureau  of Economic Research, in Tokyo, June 1988, and forthcoming  in the 
European Economic Review. 
21. The  figure  updates  a diagram  in Hooper  and  Mann,  "U.S. External  Deficit." 
22. The  index  is a weighted  average  of eight  major  countries  for which  up-to-date  data 
are  available.  The weights  are determined  by the share  of the countries  in the total trade 
(exports  plus  imports)  of the group  in 1980.  The countries  and  weights  are:  Austria,  0.029; 
Canada,  0.091;  France,  0.163; Germany,  0.254; Italy, 0.123; Japan,  0.089; Netherlands, 
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Figure 1.  The Dollar and the Real Interest Rate Differential, 1978:1-1988:6a 
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a.  Real  interest  rates  calculated  as  the long-term rate minus the CPI inflation rate of that month over  the  same 
month  of  the  previous  year.  Differential  measured  between  the  United  States  and a  weighted  average  of  other 
countries. 
previous  year. The scaling  of the diagram  is such that  each 1 percentage 
point  interest  rate  differential  corresponds  to a 6.6 percent  real  exchange 
rate movement (n = 6.6).23  Clearly, the rise in the dollar  between 1980 
and early 1985  corresponds  to a sharp  increase in the real interest  rate 
differential  in favor of the United States, while the fall of the dollar 
corresponds  to an elimination  of the interest rate differential  between 
1985  and 1988. 
The Feldstein-Marris  contention  that the fall of the dollar  signifies  a 
growing risk attached to U.S.-dollar-denominated  securities can be 
readily incorporated  in the model  just described. Instead of assuming 
perfect asset substitutability,  assume that a risk premium  is necessary 
23. This  coefficient  is based  upon  the following  regression,  for monthly  data 1978:1  to 
1988:6: 
log(PIEP*)  =  -  0.1688  +  0.066* (r -  r*) 
(22.55)  (19.83) 
R2  =  0.76; Durbin-Watson  =  0.24. Jeffrey  D. Sachs  659 
to induce  foreigners  to hold  U.S. -dollar-denominated  assets. Denote the 
risk  premium  per period  by d. The interest  arbitrage  equation,  equation 
2, becomes 
(2')  (Xt+  )ext  +  (rt  -  r* -  dt). 
Summing  over n years as before, and denoting  the average of the risk 
premiums  between year t and t + n as d,  yields 
(4')  xt =  xc  -  n(r0n -  rne- 
Now, a rise in the risk premium  requires  either a depreciation  of the 
dollar  or a rise in the interest  rate  differential,  or probably  both. 
The argument  that the dollar  is falling  because of a rising dnt  can be 
checked by asking whether the dollar has fallen more than would be 
implied  by a falling  interest  rate  differential.  Indeed, if the United States 
were in a true hard  landing,  the interest  rate differential  should  actually 
be rising as the dollar  is falling. We can see from figure  1 that this has 
not been the case. At least through  June 1988, there is little evidence 
that a rising  risk premium  on the dollar  was an important  factor in the 
decline of the dollar. 
Global Macroeconomic  Repercussions  of a Declining Dollar 
and Shrinking U.S. Trade Imbalance 
A common  refrain  of U.S. policymakers  and  many  economists  is that 
the declining  dollar  and shrinking  U.S. trade  deficit  impose  contraction- 
ary forces on the rest of the world economy. If the declining dollar 
reduces  U.S. demand  for imports  and  raises U.S. exports, the argument 
goes, domestic  demand  abroad  will tend to decline, since foreigners  will 
lose part of the U.S. market  and at the same time will devote more of 
their  demand  to less expensive U.S. products.  Therefore,  policy abroad, 
and  particularly  fiscal  policy abroad,  should  turn  more  expansionary  to 
counteract  the deflationary  impulses  coming  from  the United States. 
This argument  is certainly  not correct as a general  proposition,  and 
even the sign of the effect of U.S. policies on output  abroad  is difficult 
to predict,  for  the reasons  outlined  below. J.-P. Fitoussi  and  E. S. Phelps, 
for example, argued  in 1986  that the U.S. fiscal expansion  was a major 
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be an expansionary  policy for Europe.24  The arguments  that follow 
suggest  that as the United States reduces its budget  deficit, a sufficient 
action abroad  to maintain  demand  would be mildly  expansionary  mon- 
etary policy. Indeed, it may actually turn out that the U.S.  fiscal 
contraction  is expansionary  in its effect on foreign  economies even with 
an unchanged  path  of the foreign  money supply. 
The  effects of a falling  dollar  on growth  in the rest  of the  world  depend 
on the source  of the dollar  decline. If the dollar  moved  randomly  without 
any link  to economic  fundamentals,  then  perhaps  it would  be possible to 
speak  about  the effects of an "exogenous" change  in the exchange  rate. 
As it is, we know that movements of the dollar  are generally  linked to 
movements in the interest rate differential,  which are in turn  linked to 
shifts in macroeconomic  policy. Most of the rise in the dollar, at least 
until early 1984,  followed the jump in U.S. real interest  rates, which in 
turn resulted from the policy mix of loose fiscal and tight monetary 
policy. The decline in the dollar since 1985  is in turn  tied to the partial 
reversal  of that  policy mix and the expectation  of a further  reduction  of 
the deficit  as a proportion  of GNP, which has in turn  lowered U.S. real 
interest  rates  relative  to interest  rates abroad. 
The shifts  in fiscal  policy expectations,  and  in actual  fiscal  policy after 
1985,  are well known.  The federal  government  budget  deficit  fell from  a 
peak of 4.9 percent  of GNP in 1985  to 4.8 percent  in 1986,  3.4 percent  in 
1987,  and  a projected  3.1 percent  in 1988.25  The decline  to date, which is 
projected to continue under current legislation to a level of about 2 
percent  of GNP in 1992,  should  by itself account  for an improvement  in 
the current  account balance  of about 0.4 x  (4.9 -  3.1) = 0.72 percent 
of GNP, or roughly  $34.9  billion  in 1988.26 
It is less appreciated  that at the same time that the fiscal shift began, 
the Federal Reserve Board began a sustained  monetary  expansion, in 
support  of the policy of driving  down the dollar.  Table  7 shows the year- 
over-year  rates of growth  of reserve money and MI on a quarterly  basis 
between 1984  and 1987,  the period  of dollar  depreciation.  There  is a clear 
shift  toward  easier  monetary  policy at the beginning  of 1985,  at the same 
time  that  the interest  rate  differential  started  to narrow.  The high  money 
24. J.-P. Fitoussi  and E. S. Phelps, "Causes  of the 1980s  Slump  in Europe,"  BPEA, 
2:1986, pp. 487-513. 
25.  See OECD Economic  Outlook, no. 43 (June 1988), table 10, p.23. 
26.  See Congressional Budget Office, The  Economic andBudget  Outlook: Fiscal  Years 
1989-1993,  table  I-1, for forecasts  of future  budget  deficits  under  current  legislation. Jeffrey  D.  Sachs  661 
Table  7. Money  Growth  Rates, United  States, 1984:1-1987:2 
Year 
and  Reserve 
quarter  money  Ml 
1984:1  4.0  8.4 
1984:2  6.7  7.5 
1984:3  6.0  6.2 
1984:4  6.3  5.9 
1985:1  8.5  6.7 
1985:2  8.4  8.3 
1985:3  8.9  11.3 
1985:4  9.9  12.4 
1986:1  9.6  11.8 
1986:2  9.5  13.1 
1986:3  10.5  13.4 
1986:4  14.9  16.5 
1987:1  11.6  15.5 
1987:2  8.7  11.8 
Source:  Author's  calculations  using IMF, International  Financial  Statistics,  and updates  from OECD Economic 
Outlook.  Growth rates are quarter over  same quarter of the previous  year. Reserve  money  is defined by the IMF as 
the  sum  of  currency  in circulation,  bank reserves,  and demand  deposits  of  the  private  sector  with  the  monetary 
authorities. 
growth  continued  until  early 1987,  when it began  to slow. In response to 
this money growth, the economy expanded  faster than the underlying 
steady-state growth rate, resulting  in a fall in the unemployment  rate 
between 1985  and 1988  of about 1.5  percentage  points. 
The McKibbin-Sachs  simulation  model can suggest the dollar ex- 
change rate effects of the shift in the policy mix after 1985.27  Table 8 
shows the effects of an announced stepwise reduction  in government 
spending,  to result  in a stepwise reduction  in the budget  deficit  along  the 
lines of (but smaller  than)  the Balanced  Budget and Emergency  Deficit 
Control  Act of 1985,  better  known  as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings  act. 
As shown  in the table, the budget  deficit  is credibly  expected to improve 
by 3.8 percent of GNP in nearly equal steps over a five-year  period.28 
27. Warwick  McKibbin  and I are now preparing  a more precise assessment of the 
effects  of the policy mix, where  we examine  closely the change  in budgetary  expectations 
on a year-to-year  basis  during  1979-87. 
28. In  the simulation  exercise, government  spending  on goods and  services  is cut each 
year  by 0.8 percentage  point  of GNP. The change  in the budget  deficit  is slightly  less than 
the  cut  in spending  because  of an  endogenous  effect  on interest  rates  and  taxes. The  overall 
size of the policy  change  is somewhat  arbitrary  (Gramm-Rudman-Hollings  itself  aimed  for 
a larger  correction  of the deficit),  but  since  the model  is linear,  the effects  of a larger  budget 
correction  can  be found  simply  by multiplying  the numbers  in table  8 by the proportionate 
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Table  8.  Cumulative  Effects  on United  States,  Japan, and Germany  of a 3.8 Percent 
Reduction  in the U.S. Fiscal  Deficit  over Five Yearsa 
Percent  of GNP except where noted 
Cumulative effect 
Country  Year I  Year 2  Year 3  Year 4  Year 5 
United States 
Output  -0.4  -0.5  -0.5  -0.5  -0.2 
Real trade  balance  0.7  1.0  1.2  1.3  1.3 
Inflation  0.6  1.1  1.4  1.8  1.9 
Budget  deficit  -0.6  -  1.4  -2.2  - 3.0  - 3.8 
Long-term real interest rate  -  3.3  -  3.7  -4.2  -4.5  -4.8 
Japan 
Output  0.5  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.2 
Real trade  balance  -0.6  -0.9  -  1.1  -  1.3  -  1.4 
Inflation  0.0  0.1  -0.6  -0.9  -1.2 
Real exchange  rate  10.0  15.0  18.1  20.2  20.5 
Long-term  real interest  rate  - 3.1  - 3.3  - 3.6  - 3.8  -4.0 
Germany 
Output  1.0  0.7  0.6  0.6  0.3 
Real trade  balance  -  1.1  -  1.5  - 1.7  -  1.7  -  1.6 
Inflation  0.5  - 0.1  -0.5  - 0.8  -  1.3 
Real exchange  rate  10.9  14.8  17.3  18.4  17.6 
Long-term  real interest  rate  - 2.9  - 3.1  - 3.4  - 3.7  - 3.9 
Source:  Simulation of the McKibbin-Sachs  Global Model (2), version  October  1988. 
a.  The policy  is an anticipated  stepwise  cut in government  spending of 0.8 percent of GNP per year over a period 
of five years  (thus, an overall cut of 4.0 percent of GNP in government  spending).  Note  that the effect  on the budget 
deficit  is  slightly  less  than the  size  of  the  spending  cut,  because  of  induced  effects  on  government  tax collections 
that are built into the model.  The money  supply is adjusted each  year to maintain full employment.  Output and the 
real exchange  rate are measured as a percentage  change of their baseline  values.  The trade balance  is measured  as 
a change in percent of baseline GNP. The inflation rate and long-term real interest rate are the changes from baseline 
in percentage  points per year. A positive  value of the real exchange  rate signifies a depreciation of the dollar relative 
to the yen or the Deutschemark. 
The simulation  exercise assumes that monetary  policy accommodates 
the fiscal policy shift, with the money supply changing  enough to keep 
the U.S. unemployment  rate constant as the fiscal policy is tightened. 
The policy shift  leads on impact  to a real dollar  depreciation  against  the 
yen of 10.0 percent, and real depreciation  of about 18.1  percent by the 
third  year. This depreciation  results from the fall in U.S. interest  rates 
relative  to foreign  interest  rates on impact  of the policy change. 
The simulation also shows the likely trade balance effects of a 
sustained  application  of budget  cuts, both on the United States and on 
the rest of the world. According  to the simulation  results, the five-year 
program  of budget cutting reduces the U.S.  trade deficit relative to 
baseline by about 1.2 percent of GNP by the third year, and by 1.3 Jeffrey D. Sachs  663 
percent of GNP by the fifth year.29  The 3.8 percentage  point phased 
reduction  in fiscal deficits (from  a level of some 4.8 percent of GNP in 
calendar  year 1986)  does not come close to eliminating  the trade  deficit, 
which starts  at 3.4 percent  of GNP in 1986. 
The 1.3  percent  of GNP reduction  in the U.S. trade  deficit  by the fifth 
year is accommodated  by a shrinkage  in the Japanese  surplus  equal to 
1.4  percent  of Japanese  GNP, and  by a shrinkage  in the German  surplus 
on the order  of 1.6  percent  of German  GNP. 
The demand  effects of such a policy mix on the rest of the world can 
also be examined.  The surprising  feature  of these simulations,  one that 
is contrary  to much conventional  wisdom, is that the shift in the U.S. 
policy mix toward  fiscal  contraction  and  monetary  expansion  imparts  an 
expansionary  impulse  to the rest of the world, even though  it causes the 
dollar to depreciate and causes U.S.  net exports to rise. This result 
stands in contrast  to Marris's  warning,  for example, that "Europe and 
Japan  have not yet taken  expansionary  fiscal policy action on the scale 
necessary to offset the inevitable negative drag on their growth as the 
U.S. trade  deficit  is eliminated."30 
To understand  the reason for the positive transmission  effects, it is 
helpful  to turn  to the standard  Mundell-Fleming  model.31 The direction 
of international  transmission  of monetary  and fiscal policy in the basic 
theoretical  model  is ambiguous.  In  a U. S. fiscal  contraction,  for  example, 
the cut in the U.S. budget  deficit  leads to a dollar  depreciation,  a fall in 
U.S. output,  and  a reduction  in world  interest  rates. The first  two effects 
have a contractionary  effect on economies other  than  the United States, 
as U.S. demand  for exports from  these economies falls, while the third 
effect (the decline in world  interest  rates) should  have an expansionary 
effect by raising their consumption  and investment. The net effect is 
therefore  -ambiguous,  even though  many commentators  presume  that a 
U.S. fiscal  contraction  must slow growth  abroad. 
29. In the October  1988  version  of the McKibbin-Sachs  model  (2) reported  in table  8, 
the effect  of a deficit  reduction  on the trade  balance  is somewhat  less than  in the reported 
version  of the model  used  in Roubini  and  Sachs, "Sources  of Macroeconomic  Imbalances 
in the World  Economy,"  as reported  in table  2. 
30. See Stephen Marris, "Deficits and the Dollar Revisited" (Washington,  D.C.: 
Institute  for International  Economics,  August  1987),  p. 39. 
31. The  model  is described  in Gillis  Oudiz  and  Jeffrey  Sachs, "Macroeconomic  Policy 
Coordination  among  the Industrial  Economies,"  BPEA, 1:1984,  pp. 1-64; and  in Michael 
Bruno and Jeffrey D.  Sachs,  Economics  of Worldwide Stagflation  (Harvard University 
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The overall sign of transmission  depends on the reaction  of foreign 
wages to the appreciation  of the foreign currency vis-a-vis the dollar 
following  the U.S. fiscal contraction.32  If foreign  nominal  wage growth 
slows down as the foreign currency  appreciates,  then it is more likely 
that the foreign economy will expand in reaction to the U.S.  fiscal 
contraction.  If the foreign  nominal  wage is perfectly  rigid,  on the other 
hand, then simple theory demonstrates  that the foreign  economy must 
contract  in response to contractionary  U.S. fiscal policy. The conven- 
tional  wisdom  is based on the simple  model  of fixed nominal  wages. The 
McKibbin-Sachs  simulation  model, on the other hand,  assumes a fairly 
high response in Europe and Japan of the nominal wage changes to 
consumer price changes, and therefore indirectly to exchange rate 
changes. 
The theoretical  ambiguity  of the sign of international  transmission  is 
also true for monetary  policy. A U.S. monetary  expansion  put in place 
alongside a  contractionary  fiscal policy has three effects: a dollar 
depreciation,  a rise in U.S. output, and a fall in world interest rates.33 
The first effect tends to reduce foreign aggregate  demand  by shifting 
overall  demand  from  foreign  goods to U.S. goods. The second and  third 
effects tend to raise foreign demand. Once again, the overall effect 
depends on the foreign nominal wage response to the exchange rate 
appreciation  of the foreign  currency  that  is caused  by the U.S. monetary 
expansion. With nominal wage rigidity abroad, the U.S.  monetary 
expansion must cause a decline in foreign output. With high nominal 
wage  flexibility,  the U.S. monetary  expansion  will cause a rise in foreign 
output. 
These simulation  results undermine  the presumption  that a shift in 
the U.S.  policy mix toward fiscal contraction  and easier money will 
reduce  foreign  aggregate  demand.  The presumption  is especially weak- 
ened in view of the substantial  evidence of a rather  close relationship 
between nominal  wage change and consumer  price changes in Europe 
and  Japan.  The simulation  results cannot, of course, prove the case one 
way or another. Since it is naive to believe that one could actually get 
32. Oudiz  and  Sachs, "Macroeconomic  Policy  Coordination." 
33. In the simulation  results, the fiscal policy contraction  leads immediately  to a 
reduction  of long-term  U.S. real interest rates by more than 3 percentage  points. In 
Germany  and  Japan,  the effect is 3.1 and  2.9 percentage  point  reductions,  respectively. Jeffrey D. Sachs  665 
sound econometric estimates of the transmission  effect, the sign and 
size of the transmission  effects from  the United States to the rest of the 
world  must  remain  uncertain.34 
The skepticism  that  the simulations  generate  about  the conventional 
view, however, seems more realistic than the continuing "surprise" 
expressed in the past year about the vigorous growth  in the European 
and Japanese  economies despite the depreciating  dollar. As predicted 
by the simulation  model, Japan has experienced a domestic demand 
boom during 1987 and 1988 that has more than compensated  for the 
negative  growth  effects of the declining  real trade  surplus.  Similarly,  in 
1988, Germany  is now experiencing 3.5 percent to 4 percent annual 
growth  for  the  first  time  in  many  years, based  on domestic-led  investment 
demand.  Many  forecasters  had predicted  German  growth  this year of 2 
percent  or under.35  It is notable  that German  unemployment  continued 
to rise throughout 1982-84, when the Deutschemark  was weak and 
exports to the United States were booming,  and began  to fall only after 
1985,  with the advent of dollar  depreciation  and Deutschemark  appre- 
ciation.36 
34. If, in the end, expansionary  measures  are needed abroad  to compensate  for the 
shrinking  U.S. fiscal  deficit  (that  is, if the export  effects abroad  turn  out to dominate  the 
interest  rate effects), there are good reasons to look for policies that can raise demand 
while preserving  the tight  fiscal policies in the European  and Japanese  economies. In a 
world of insufficient  overall saving, and with a particular  scarcity of capital for the 
developing  world,  growth  measures  that  maintain  saving  are  of particular  value. 
Three  kinds  of stimulative  policies  could  be pursued  that  would  also not restrict  global 
saving. Most obviously, any slowdown in foreign demand  could be counteracted  by 
expansionary  monetary  policies  abroad.  Second,  in view of the acute  unemployment  rates 
in the EC economies, combined  with German  hesitancy  to expand  money  growth,  there 
would  seem  to be a case for  a significant  depreciation  of the non-Deutschemark  currencies 
within  the European  Monetary  System, combined  with a monetary  expansion  in those 
countries.  Third,  rather  than  undertake  direct  fiscal expansion,  Europe  and Japan  could 
increase the recycling  of money to the cash-constrained  debtor countries. The global 
expansionary  effects of an increased  dollar  of loans to the problem  debtor  countries  is 
roughly  equivalent  to a direct  increase  of a dollar  of deficit  financing. 
35. In September  1987,  the IMF predicted  West German  growth  of 2.1 percent  for 
1988. In April 1988, the forecast was revised downward  to 1.7 percent per year. In 
September  1988,  the IMF  projected  2.9 percent  growth  for the year. The main  economic 
institutes  of West  Germany,  as of October  1988,  were forecasting  around  3.5 percent  per 
year.  See "Budgets  Built  to Last," Economist (October  29, 1988),  p. 76. 
36. The German  unemployment  rates for the years 1982  to 1987  were: 6.7, 8.2, 8.2, 
8.3, 8.0, 7.9. See OECD Economic  Outlook, no. 43 (June  1988),  p. 187,  table  R18. 666  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1988 
The Present Risk to the U.S. Economy: Overheating, 
Not Hard Landing 
In my view, concerns  about  a hard  landing  for the U.S. economy are 
overstated.  Over  the next few years, risks  probably  fall more  on the side 
of excessive inflation  than  on the side of a slump. In this final  section, I 
outline two reasons for concern over inflationary  prospects in the 
economy, both related  to the depreciation  of the dollar. 
A significant  part  of the dollar  depreciation  since 1985  has been based 
on the expectation of a continuation  of fiscal restraint  along Gramm- 
Rudman-Hollings  lines. Since the dollar  has returned  in real  terms  to the 
values of the late 1970s,  when both the current  account and the federal 
budget were in virtual balance, the level of the real exchange rate is 
likely, in the intermediate  run, to lead to excess  demand in the U.S. 
economy  if the current  levels of budget  deficits  persist.  The combination 
of rising  net exports, induced  by the weak dollar,  and  the strong  internal 
demand, induced by the continuing  budget deficit, will spill over into 
excess demand  and  rising  inflation.  If the budget  deficit  remains  stuck  in 
place, then the dollar  would  have to appreciate  once again  in real  terms. 
That could happen through  a reversal of the nominal  depreciation  of 
recent years, or through  a rise in the domestic price level, holding  fixed 
the nominal  exchange  rate. 
The second inflationary  risk could arise if the monetary  authorities 
were to attempt to push the dollar still lower through  expansionary 
monetary policy, in the vain attempt to reduce the external deficit 
through  money-induced  dollar  depreciation.  As already  noted,  monetary 
ease can raise exports and overall income if there is less than full 
employment, but it is not particularly  effective in reducing a trade 
imbalance.  Any  attempt  to target  monetary  policy  on the  external  balance 
is bound  to lead to frustration  and  inflationary  pressures. 
So far, the inflationary  effects of the weaker  dollar  have been modest, 
for two unexpected  reasons. First, the pass-through  of the dollar  depre- 
ciation into higher  import  prices of finished  goods has been lower than 
usual, as foreign  producers  have "priced to market"  more than usual. 
Second, the dollar price of oil has continued to plummet  even as the 
dollar exchange rate has weakened significantly.  (Most other primary Jeffrey D. Sachs  667 
commodities  prices have risen along with the decline of the dollar, in 
line with historical  experience.)  These factors have so far  restrained  the 
inflationary  effects of the dollar's decline, and it is only a gamble that 
they can be relied upon in the next few years to help maintain  price 
stability. Comments 
and Discussion 
Robert Z. Lawrence: As in a song currently  near  the top of the charts, 
the refrain  in Jeffrey Sachs's paper is "Don't worry." In particular, 
don't worry about the rest of the world. Those of you who believe the 
United States should  do nothing  about  the fiscal  and  trade  deficits,  don't 
worry-the  world will finance  it. Those of you who believe the United 
States  should  and  perhaps-the optimists  among  you-will  do something 
about the fiscal deficit, don't worry-U.S.  budget cuts will not trigger 
world recession. Indeed, a fiscal contraction  in the United States may 
actually  be expansionary  for the rest of the world. I should  add that no 
one need worry  about  foreign  willingness  to finance  the current  account 
deficit. 
I am sympathetic  to the central  message  of the paper.  Many  who have 
been disappointed  in the lack of U.S. fiscal discipline have forecast a 
crisis to spur  greater  action. In this vein the latest is the view that  unless 
the next administration  quickly  takes a significant  step toward  reducing 
the deficit, we will see a crisis in the foreign  exchange  market,  followed 
perhaps  by a global  recession. But the crash-landing  forecasts  have been 
notably inaccurate.  The prediction  was that a falling dollar would be 
associated  with much  higher  U.S. inflation  and  interest  rates, slow U..S. 
growth, and a slump abroad. In fact, since 1985  the dollar has indeed 
fallen-the  decline has been of the order of magnitude  predicted by 
Stephen Marris'-but it has been accompanied  by lower U.S. interest 
rates, sustained  U.S. growth,  relatively  low U.S. inflation,  and  a pickup 
in growth  in Europe and (with a lag) in Japan. Now the critical  reason 
1.  Stephen  Marris, Deficits  and  the  Dollar:  The  World Economy  at  Risk,  Policy 
Analyses in International  Economics 14 (Washington,  D.C.: Institute  for International 
Economics, 1985). 
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for the differences between the crash-landing  scenario and what has 
happened  lies in the distinction between market-initiated  and policy- 
initiated adjustment. The dollar's decline, as Sachs points out, has 
occurred not because of a stampede out of dollars but because of 
fundamental  changes in policies. We have seen a shift toward easier 
monetary  and  tighter  fiscal  policy in the United States, and, I would  add, 
a shift toward easier policies abroad. Indeed, OECD data show that 
Germany,  the  country  we generally  pick  on  as a  growth  laggard,  increased 
its cyclically adjusted  budget  deficit  by 0.3 percent  of GDP in 1986  and 
1987, and is expected to add an additional 1.0 percent of stimulus in 
1988. 
I also agree with Sachs that the current  path of fiscal and current 
account  deficits appears  to be sustainable  for several years. As I see it, 
the U.S.  current  account deficit will be on the order of 2 percent of 
GDP-or  around  $110 billion in 1989. Borrowing  this amount  for five 
years might add around  three-quarters  of a percent of GNP in perma- 
nently  higher  net foreign  interest  servicing  but will not entail  a solvency 
problem  for the United States. 
The current  U.S. situation  is in fact pernicious  precisely because of 
the weakness of the constraints-both  political and external. Simply 
because the situation  is sustainable  does not imply that it is desirable. 
The primary  cause for concern is not the rest of the world pulling  the 
plug but the slump  in our national  saving rate. While we may question 
the accuracy  of our measures  of the levels of national  saving,  the size of 
the real budget  deficit, and the absolute magnitude  of U.S. net indebt- 
edness, no one disputes that there have been major  declines in these 
variables in the 1980s. And yet, given the need to raise productivity 
growth and provide for the baby-boom generation's retirement, the 
United  States should  be saving  more, not less, than  its historic  average. 
The  bottom  line  is that  the United  States  looks creditworthy.  A second 
consideration  is foreign  willingness  to accumulate  U.S. debt. In a world 
of imperfect  substitutes,  even creditworthy  borrowers  will have to pay 
higher  rates to increase  their  borrowing.  But Sachs points out that U.S. 
borrowing  is a relatively small share of developed-country  saving. He 
uses gross saving;  I would  use net. In that  case the U.S. share  is around 
16  percent  rather  than  9.5 percent,  but the borrowing  still looks sustain- 
able  to me. 
It is, however,  important  to remember  that  even net creditor  countries 670  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1988 
can have sizable foreign exchange rate crises.  Let me note some 
disquieting  evidence that suggests such a crisis cannot be dismissed. 
First, Sachs argues  that  exchange  rates can be readily  explained  by real 
interest  rate differentials.  But the fit is by no means perfect. There is a 
conspicuous divergence between actual and predicted  exchange rates 
shown in his figure  around  the begining  of 1985-a  period  many would 
argue  was a bubble.  And  if we have  had  bubbles  and  irrational  overshoot- 
ing on the upside, we cannot  rule it out on the downside. 
Second, and in a similar vein, the market has been a biased and 
remarkably  poor forecaster  of exchange  rates. Even those who think  its 
judgment  is the best we have must  concede that  it is not very good. I find 
it hard  to find solace in the absence of a risk premium  on U.S. debt. In 
1981,  commenting  on a paper  in this  journal  on LDC debt, Sachs himself 
dismissed the possibility  of a crisis, based on evidence that the market 
placed  low risk  premiums  on LDC debt.2 
Third, recall that in 1987 official financing  played a major role in 
supporting  the U.S.  current account deficit-suggesting  that without 
this assistance, market  forces might  have driven  the dollar  much lower 
because of impatience  about the lack of improvement  in the current 
account. Once the improvement  became clear to the market  this year, 
private confidence was restored. The argument  made by those of the 
crash-landing  school is that once the current  U.S. improvement  comes 
to an end, private market  jitters will return. Indeed, implicitly, the 
absorption  approach  Sachs uses to forecast the current  account implies 
even less improvement  than do most conventional  partial-equilibrium 
models. 
Finally, the crash-landing  school would say that the United States 
has been incredibly  lucky, both in having  excess capacity in the global 
economy and in having  falling  oil prices. Such good fortune  cannot be 
counted  on in the future. 
A foreign exchange rate crisis cannot be ruled out. It is of course 
important  to remember  that a sharp  decline in the dollar  need not mean 
a crash  landing  for the real  economy. While  a further  decline  in the dollar 
may  present  problems  for macroeconomic  policy, it does not necessarily 
lead to a U.S. or global  recession. 
2. Discussion of Robert Solomon, "The Debt of Developing Countries:  Another 
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Ultimately the crash landing could come from two developments: 
first, a widespread  perception  the United States had entered a serious 
inflationary  period  (and  was trying  to renege  on its debt), and, second, a 
sense that  leadership  in the United States was weak. Responsibility  for 
avoiding  the first  possibility  rests primarily  with the Federal  Reserve. A 
speedy response in U.S. interest  rates that  addresses  the concern  about 
inflation  will, as we have  seen over  the  past  few months,  induce  foreigners 
to continue  to lend. It will also, in the medium  term,  improve  the current 
account  by slowing  U.S. growth.  Responsibility  for avoiding  the second 
possibility  rests with the president  and Congress.  They need to do more 
than  communicate  through  lip-reading.  The perception  of a strong  U.S. 
leadership  would  allow the United States to muddle  through  for a while, 
but divided  leadership  could make  foreign  investors  very nervous. 
Even if an exchange rate crisis were to erupt, the United States still 
has a major  mechanism  for procrastination-borrowing  in foreign cur- 
rencies. Foreigners sell dollar assets because of exchange rate and 
interest fears, not fears of U.S. insolvency. Foreign central banks, in 
particular,  would  probably  accumulate  Bush bonds for quite a while. 
What  about the danger  of a foreign contraction  if the United States 
actually  does something  about  the deficit?  I think  Sachs  has an important 
point  about  mechanisms  that  operate  to stimulate  foreign  demand  when 
the dollar  falls. I would  strengthen  his point  first  by referring  to the actual 
evidence on nominal  wages over the past three years in the OECD. It 
looks as though  nominal  wages have fallen  in every OECD  country  from 
1985  to 1987.  But I think  Sachs fails to give sufficient  credit  to the most 
important  mechanism-the endogenous  policy responses. We live today 
in a mixed system of both fixed and floating rates. And we know 
unambiguously  that  monetary  policy shifts  lead to synchronized  fluctua- 
tions under fixed rates. When the United States has eased monetary 
policy over the past few years, foreigners  have tended to lean against 
the wind, resisting the appreciation  of their currencies  and increasing 
their  monetary  growth. This effect has also been clearly evident in the 
reverse  direction  this year as U.S. tightening  has led to dollar  apprecia- 
tion and foreign  resistance  by tightening  monetary  policy. This mecha- 
nism  suggests  that  a falling  dollar  induced  by additional  fiscal  contraction 
in the United States is likely to raise foreign money supplies endoge- 
nously as it did in 1986. Indeed one would hope this would be the 
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policies over the past three years for avoiding  a global  slump  and would 
expect similar  responses in the future. 
Sachs makes an interesting case that, because it stimulates U.S. 
domestic  investment,  eliminating  the federal  budget  deficit  will by itself 
not suffice to bring  the current  account into balance. He also suggests 
monetary  policy can have little or no impact  on the current  account. If 
he is correct, foreign investment must grow more rapidly  than foreign 
saving to aid the U.S. current  account adjustment.  It will be important 
to stimulate  European  capacity expansion and allow developing coun- 
tries debt relief, so they can shift  toward  investment-led  growth. 
Let me conclude by stressing  that the U.S. problem  is not solvency 
but an inadequate  provision  for the future. The main reason to reduce 
the federal budget  deficit is to raise U.S. national  saving over the long 
run, not to avoid a foreign  exchange  rate crisis in the short  run. We and 
the world should  be fine as long as the initiative  for deficit  reduction  is 
held by the United States. Should  the United States lose that initiative, 
however, a market-imposed  adjustment  cannot  be ruled  out. 
General  Discussion 
Sachs's simulations  showing  that  a reduction  of the U.S. fiscal  deficit 
has an expansionary  effect abroad  drew  considerable  comment.  George 
Perry asked Sachs to elaborate  on the mechanism  that generates this 
negative transmission  of fiscal policy. According to Sachs, the result 
relies  on the responsiveness  of foreign  nominal  wages  to the depreciation 
of the dollar  coming  from the U.S. fiscal contraction.  Foreign  nominal 
wages must fall relative to foreign prices in response to cheaper U.S. 
imports  that lower foreign  consumers'  cost of living. Sachs argued  that 
this reduction  in foreign  wages will result  in foreign  output  greater  than 
that in the simple Mundell-Fleming  model where nominal wages are 
fixed and the transmission  of fiscal  policy is positive. 
Ralph  Bryant  observed that this negative transmission  result distin- 
guished  the McKibbin-Sachs  Global  Model  (MSG2)  from  other  empirical 
models of the international  economy, noting  that it differed  from  all the 
simulations  in  a 1986  comparison  of models  in  which  Sachs  and  McKibbin 
both participated.  Bryant  acknowledged  that  foreign  monetary  authori- 
ties might  well respond  to a fiscal contraction  in the United States with 
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U.S.  fiscal contraction  could lead to an expansion of foreign output. 
However, he noted that the MSG2 simulations  hold monetary  policies 
fixed as the U.S. fiscal deficit  is reduced. Peter Hooper noted that even 
in the 1986  simulations  to which Bryant  referred,  several  characteristics 
of the MSG2  model made it stand out from other models. By the very 
end of  the simulation period the model predicted at worst a zero 
transmission  of fiscal policy shocks. Furthermore,  the model had an 
extreme, nearly  one-for-one,  response of foreign  interest  rates to U.S. 
rates. Other  models displayed  less than half as much  decline in foreign 
interest  rates  in response  to lower U.S. interest  rates. Hooper  noted  that 
regardless  of whether  the MSG2  model is correct in its specification  of 
foreign monetary reactions, Sachs's results suggest that the negative 
transmission  effects of a U.S.  fiscal contraction  could be offset by a 
monetary  expansion  abroad. 
Edmund  Phelps believed Sachs's simulation  results were plausible 
empirically  as well as theoretically. He pointed to the pickup in the 
economies of Sweden, Britain,  and Germany  that  had accompanied  the 
reduction  of the U.S. fiscal deficit without any major  changes in these 
countries'  own fiscal  policies. Phelps  went on to discuss simulations  by 
John  Taylor  that  showed  the Fitoussi-Phelps  expansionary  effect of U. S. 
fiscal tightening  on European  output overtaking  the Mundell-Fleming 
contractionary  effect after about 10-12 quarters. Georges de Menil 
reported  that, with a reasonable  range  of parameter  values, simulations 
can yield ambiguous  results  on the transmission  of fiscal  policy, so there 
was no firm  basis for predicting  the effects on foreign output of U.S. 
fiscal contraction.  But he added  that the decline in world interest  rates 
that  would  follow  a reduction  in  the U. S. budget  deficit  is highly  desirable. 
Bradford  De  Long discussed the relation between the U.S.  real 
exchange  rate and  the real interest  rate differential.  He observed that  in 
Sachs's  figure  1, the real  exchange  rate  is now at about  the 1979-80  level, 
but that the real interest  rate differential  is now about 3 percent higher 
than  it was in 1979-80.  De Long  reasoned  that  either  the equilibrium  real 
exchange  rate has fallen dramatically  or, more plausibly,  foreign  inves- 
tors now require  a larger  real interest rate differential  in order to hold 
dollar  assets. Peter  Hooper  agreed  with  the  thrust  ofDe Long's  comment. 
He noted that, historically,  a 1 percent change in the real interest rate 
differential  has been associated with a 7 percent change in the real 
exchange  rate. Since 1985, the real interest rate differential  has fallen 
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the 55 percent  fall in the real exchange rate. Hooper reasoned that the 
other half could be due to either of the two sources identified  by De 
Long. However, Sachs noted that part of the fall in the real exchange 
rate should be seen as undoing  the bubble that drove the value of the 
dollar  about  20 percent  too high  in 1985. 
James  Duesenberry  thought  Sachs's focus on simplified  models and 
simulations  was too narrow.  Clearly  a hard  landing  will not be the most 
likely econometric forecast based on a reasonable range of policy 
choices. According  to Duesenberry, the true risks come not from the 
steady-state accumulation  of debt, but from exogenous events and 
contingencies  that cannot  be captured  in a simple  model. He advocated 
looking at the range of shocks, such as fears of inflation,  fears of an 
adverse change in U.S. policy, or events elsewhere in the world, that 
might hit the economic system. For example, it is  disturbing that 
substantial  central  bank  intervention  was required  to support  the dollar 
during 1987. He further advocated assessing the policy actions that 
governments  will take in response to such shocks. The true  risk  lies in a 
situation  where the authorities  fail to pull themselves together  to meet a 
crisis. Albert  Wojnilower  observed  that  a set of countries  such as Japan, 
Korea, Mexico, and Thailand  will, because of culture or outstanding 
debt, continue  to produce  more  than  they consume  over the foreseeable 
future. Therefore,  other industrialized  countries should not engage in 
"beggar  thy neighbor"  policies  in  order  to run  current  account  surpluses. 
He saw the adoption of these negative sum policies by industrialized 
countries  as an example  of the type of risk  emphasized  by Duesenberry. 
Benjamin  Friedman  discussed portfolio risks that might arise from 
the shrinking  trade  deficit. He observed that  in certain  markets  for hard 
assets, such as real estate in major  U.S. cities, foreigners  have recently 
become essentially  the only buyers. If the trade  deficit  is eliminated,  this 
foreign demand  for hard  assets will dwindle, and prices for these hard 
assets might have to fall considerably  before domestic investors are 
again attracted to buy. The fall in asset prices could have further 
repercussions  if their  domestic owners are highly  leveraged. However, 
he added that it may be several years before this problem  materializes 
because foreigner investors currently are holding a historically low 
proportion  of their U.S. portfolios  in the form  of hard  assets. Friedman 
predicted  that  foreign  investors  will continue  to demand  hard  assets for 
a time as they attempt  to balance  their  portfolios. 